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INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS: THE 
CASE FOR ALASKA RECLAIMING 
ITS CULTURAL PROPERTY 
REBECCA KITCHENS* 
ABSTRACT 
Because of the historically troubling treatment of American Indians by the 
United States government, the nation’s native populations have been largely 
unable to control their cultural identities. Cultural property laws provide a 
framework for transferring stolen art and cultural objects to their native 
owners in an attempt to return cultural sovereignty to native communities. 
Despite Alaska’s large and thriving native population, Alaska Natives have 
trailed behind other states’ native populations in asserting their cultural 
property rights. This Note considers the current cultural property framework 
and its evolution in an effort to understand why Alaska Natives are not 
seeking return of their cultural objects to the same extent as other native 
groups. 
INTRODUCTION 
Years of oppression and unfair treaties have strained American 
Indians’ relationship with the United States government1 and have 
hampered their ability to control their cultural identities. Since the 
arrival of Europeans in the United States, settlors have taken land, 
 
* Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2012; Duke University, M.A. Art 
History expected 2012. University of Pennsylvania, B.A. History of Art and 
Political Science, 2009. The author would like to thank her grandmother, 
Fleurette Kitchens, for introducing her to art history when she was six years old. 
 1.  See generally Rosita Worl, The First Peoples of Alaska: A Path to Self-
Determination, in LIVING OUR CULTURES, SHARING OUR HERITAGE: THE FIRST 
PEOPLES OF ALASKA 36, 36–38 (Aron L. Crowell et al. eds., 2010) (discussing the 
federal government’s taking of indigenous land in 1867 and the following 
treatment of the native community); Lisa M. Poupart, The Familiar Face of 
Genocide: Internalized Oppression Among American Indians, HYPATIA, Spring 2003, 
at 86, 87–97 (discussing the American Indian experience of colonization); Kelly 
E. Yasaitis, NAGPRA: A Look Back Through the Litigation, 25 J. LAND RESOURCES & 
ENVTL. L. 259, 259 (2005) (citing Rebecca Tsosie, Sacred Obligations: Intercultural 
Justice and the Disclosure of Treaty Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1662 (2000) 
(comparing massacres of American Indians to enslaved Africans and Jews 
during the Holocaust)). 
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cultural objects, funerary remains, and other tangible objects from their 
original American Indian owners. With these objects went American 
Indians’ cultural sovereignty and freedom to tell their stories through 
art and cultural objects. In many cases, objects acquired by European 
settlers have been displayed in museums beyond the control of 
American Indian audiences, thereby excluding American Indian 
perspectives.2 
Alaska Natives endured maltreatment along with their mainland 
counterparts.3 Alaska Native art and cultural objects were taken from 
their creators.4 For centuries, Alaska Native artists have created 
carvings, baskets, dolls, drums, prints, etchings, and other art forms to 
express religious and cultural identity.5 A number of materials used, 
such as flexible jaw material from baleen whales and Alaskan mammal 
furs, are not only visually appealing but also important from 
educational and art historical perspectives.6 Objects made from these 
materials reveal much about the history of Alaska Native groups and 
their traditional lifestyles and cultures.7 Techniques employed by Alaska 
Native artists, such as serigraphy8 and relief carving, are central to both 
art history and education.9 
 
 2. Cf. Douglas Cole, Tricks of the Trade: Some Reflections on Anthropological 
Collecting, 28 ARCTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 48, 50 (1991) (describing how museums are 
largely a western invention and that few museums have “collected objects from 
Natives for Native viewing”). 
 3.  See Worl, supra note 1, at 36 (discussing the federal government’s taking 
of indigenous land in 1867 and the treatment of the native community 
afterwards). 
 4.  Cf. Rosita Worl, The Treaty of NAGPRA and Religious Renewal, An 
Address to Keepers of the Treasures – Alaska, ARCTIC STUDIES CENTER, 
http://www.mnh.si.edu/arctic/html/repatrw.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2012) 
(speaking as an Alaska Native and anthropologist about the Native American 
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act and noting “[t]he assaults on Native 
cultures, including the removal of cultural and sacred objects, have been 
extensive and continuous”). 
 5.  ALASKA STATE COUNCIL ON THE ARTS, ALASKA NATIVE ART (2007), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/products/pro05.pdf. 
 6.  See id. (discussing art forms employed by Alaska Native artists). 
 7.  See id. The term “object” is used throughout this Note to collectively 
refer to the wide variety of American Indian funerary remains and cultural 
items. I do not intend to infer that these treasures are mere “objects” or aesthetic 
goods devoid of cultural or religious significance. Rather, I use the term for ease 
of discussing an otherwise diverse body of religious, spiritual, and cultural 
works, recognizing them to be more than mere “objects” to their respective 
cultures. 
 8.  A silk-screening process. 
 9.  See ALASKA STATE COUNCIL ON THE ARTS, supra note 5. 
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Modern cultural property laws were enacted in part to celebrate 
American Indians’ unique art forms and their respective cultures10 as 
well as to compensate native communities for past injustices.11 Cultural 
property laws also give native communities a means of regaining 
control over their cultural property and cultural identities.12 Unlike 
some native tribes in the contiguous states, Alaska Natives have not 
taken advantage of these laws to their full potential. Only a small 
number of Alaska Natives have sought recovery of stolen art, and those 
that have done so hail primarily from the largest Alaska Native cultures. 
Now more than ever, considering Alaska Natives’ position in the 
cultural property discourse is critical. Legislation in 1990 ushered in a 
modern cultural property framework,13 but this area of law remains 
largely unsettled and many issues have not yet been addressed. The 
national attention focused on American Indian cultural property laws 
has increased since the 1970s, and this area is likely to become more 
important in coming years. Although Alaska has a large and thriving 
native population, Alaska Natives have been relatively silent in this 
discourse. Alaska Natives’ silence may limit their ability to control their 
cultural destiny into the future, and it suggests problems inherent in the 
current legal framework. The current cultural property regime does not 
treat all native groups equally; while American Indians as a group are 
generally viewed as “outsiders” to the cultural property discourse, some 
native groups are further limited in their ability to use the laws. 
This Note considers the evolution and current status of cultural 
property law. It also considers why Alaska Natives are not as active as 
some other native groups in asserting cultural property rights. Part I 
gives an overview of American Indian cultural property’s position in the 
larger cultural property discourse. Part II discusses the development of 
American Indian cultural property rights with an overview of the 
relevant statutes. Part III describes the complexity surrounding 
NAGPRA, the most important law pertaining to American Indian 
cultural property. Part IV discusses Alaska Natives limited utilization of 
NAGPRA and the importance of Alaska Native cultural property.  Part 
V considers possible explanations for Alaska’s relative silence in the 
 
 10.  See infra notes 91–93 and accompanying text (describing the objectives of 
the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act). 
 11.  See Sarah Harding, Justifying Repatriation of Native American Cultural 
Property, 72 IND. L.J. 723, 739 (1997) (explaining repatriation as a form of 
collective compensation for past losses). 
 12.  See infra notes 91–113 and accompanying text (explaining the availability 
of repatriation under the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation 
Act). 
 13.  See 25 U.S.C. § 3001 (2012). 
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cultural property discourse. Part VI considers affirmative steps Alaska 
Natives could take to assert cultural property rights. 
I. AMERICAN INDIAN ART IN CULTURAL PROPERTY LEGAL 
DISCOURSE 
Before considering the relationship between American cultural 
property law and Alaska Native art, this Note considers the placement 
of American Indian art within cultural property law more generally. 
Although terms such as “cultural property” and “repatriation” can be 
defined broadly enough to encompass American Indian art, an 
inspection of key definitions reveals that American Indian art was not 
initially included within the protected class of cultural property. 
Black’s Law Dictionary, which places cultural property within the 
category of international law, defines “cultural property” as: 
Movable and immovable property that has cultural 
significance, whether in the nature of antiquities and 
monuments of a classical age or important modern items of fine 
arts, decorative arts, and architecture. Some writers prefer the 
term cultural heritage, which more broadly includes intangible 
cultural things such as folklore, crafts, and skills.14 
The definition’s first clause, “moveable and immovable property that 
has cultural significance,”15 delineates art protected by cultural property 
laws from art beyond protection. The criterion for protection is “cultural 
significance,”16 requiring courts to judge art’s importance. This contrasts 
with other American legal traditions that aspire to view art forms as 
equal.17 Copyright law, for example, theoretically applies to all art fixed 
in a tangible medium of expression so long as the art meets a threshold 
originality requirement.18 Judges are not meant to inquire into the 
underlying value of the art.19 
 
 14.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 436 (9th ed. 2009). 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  See, e.g., The Copyright Act § 102, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (laying the 
foundation for copyright law, which advocates against aesthetic discrimination). 
 18.  Id.; see, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–
52 (1903) (holding copyright should be considered without inquiring into the 
subjective novelty of a work of expression). 
 19.  Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251–52. An argument can be made that the Visual 
Artists Rights Act (VARA) changed this baseline assumption. See 17 U.S.C. § 
106A (2012). Although judges continue to struggle with VARA’s reach and other 
moral rights elements that have been inserted into U.S. law, a strong argument 
can be made that the American legal community does not intend to impose 
KITCHENS.V23 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2012  6:08 PM 
2012 RECLAIMING CULTURAL PROPERTY 117 
The cultural property definition also gives examples of protected 
art forms, listing “antiquities and monuments of a classical age or 
important modern items of fine arts, decorative arts, and architecture.”20 
Using the phrase “classical age” suggests a traditional American legal 
view of defining what cultural property is important historically. By 
including “important modern works,”21 the definition reinforces the 
burden of judging a work’s importance. Significantly, the definition 
places cultural property law squarely into the category of international 
law, reflecting a traditional view that foreign objects are more highly 
valued from a cultural property perspective than those created locally. 
Because this Note focuses on cultural property in the context of 
American Indian and Alaska Native art and objects, an additional term 
must be considered. Repatriation is central to the American Indian 
cultural property discourse,22 and returning objects represents a tangible 
means of gauging which objects American law deems central enough to 
outside societies’ cultures to be completely returned. Black’s Law 
Dictionary does not provide a definition for “repatriation,” suggesting 
this area of law may not yet be central in American legal discourse. The 
National Museum of the American Indian, a branch of the Smithsonian 
Institution,23 defines “repatriation” as: 
[T]he process whereby specific kinds of American Indian 
cultural items in a museum collection are returned to lineal 
descendants and culturally affiliated Indian tribes, Alaska 
Native clans or villages, and/or Native Hawaiian 
organizations. Human remains, funerary objects, sacred 
objects, and objects of cultural patrimony are all materials that 
may be considered for repatriation.24 
“Human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural 
patrimony”25 are terms that are not self-defining.26 Moreover, American 
 
outright requirements of artistic significance or importance as a prerequisite to 
such protection. 
 20.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 436 (9th ed. 2009). 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Harding, supra note 11, at 723–27 (discussing the increased role of 
repatriation in the protection of American Indian art and its legal justification). 
 23.  Repatriation, NATIONAL MUSEUM OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN, 
http://americanindian.si.edu/subpage.cfm?subpage=collections&second=collect
ions&third=repatriation (last visited Feb. 18, 2012). As a museum with a 
significant American Indian collection that is central to developing American 
Indian voices in cultural depictions, the National Museum of the American 
Indian has an acute interest in representing this issue fairly and accurately. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  See id. 
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Indian religions vary significantly,27 and no single definition will 
adequately protect every unique culture or religious belief. 
Beyond definitions, American Indian cultural property is often in 
the shadow of international cultural property in the art law discourse. 
Discussions of art law elites have often overlooked American Indian art, 
at least historically, and focused on issues surrounding antiquities and 
Nazi-era art thefts.28 Much of the American legal community remains 
preoccupied with works created and often sold beyond U.S. borders. 
The website of the American Bar Association Committee on Art and 
Cultural Heritage Law29 lists as topics recently considered: “1970 
UNESCO Convention and international trade in antiquities, underwater 
cultural heritage, art works stolen during the Holocaust, ratification of 
the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict, and the impact of war on the cultural heritage 
of Iraq.”30 American Indian art is not addressed.31 In the United States 
and abroad, the art law community’s preoccupation with international 
cultural property issues may explain why American Indian art has been 
slow to receive protection. While European and Middle Eastern artists 
are “insiders” from the perspective of the cultural property community, 
American Indian artists were slow to receive protection even on a 
domestic scale. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN INDIAN CULTURAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The United States legal tradition has not protected American Indian 
art until relatively recently. The slow pace at which American Indians 
were able to gain cultural sovereignty over their cultural works 
demonstrates American Indians’ outsider status in the cultural property 
sphere. After the oppression faced by American Indians at the hand of 
 
 27.  See ÅKE HULTKRANTZ, THE RELIGIONS OF THE AMERICAN INDIANS 3 (1979) 
(writing that American Indian religions only “constitute a unity” from a 
“superficial perspective” and giving examples of different native belief systems). 
 28.  See, e.g., ILLICIT CULTURAL PROPERTY: A WEBLOG ABOUT ART, ANTIQUITIES 
AND THE LAW, http://illicit-cultural-property.blogspot.com (last visited Feb. 18, 
2012) (discussing primarily works of international origin and not addressing 
works created in the United States). 
 29.  The committee is composed of attorneys with a special interest in “the 
field of art, cultural heritage, and cultural property” and the representatives 
include many prominent lawyers experienced in private practice, museums, 
government, and academia. Art and Cultural Heritage Committee, AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=IC936000 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2012). 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
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the United States government, laws partially benefiting injured tribes 
began to emerge in the 1930s.32 Laws addressing American Indian 
cultural property were, in large part, drafted by those outside the native 
community, and groups and tribes within the American Indian umbrella 
were protected differently. The development of American Indian 
cultural property and repatriation laws can be divided into a number of 
periods based on the reasoning behind the laws’ enactments.33 
A.  Precursors to “Modern” American Indian Cultural Property Laws 
As a general trend, early laws implicating American Indian art 
focused primarily on cultural objects’ archaeological or economic 
significance on a national scale. The laws did not attempt to expand 
American Indians’ property rights in their own works. Efforts to protect 
American Indian art, even early efforts, reveal gaps in protection present 
in the current framework and partially expose the unique position of 
Alaska Natives.  
The 1906 Antiquities Act was the first significant American law 
involving cultural property protection.34 The Antiquities Act authorizes 
the President to protect historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric 
structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest located on 
federally owned land as national monuments.35 The Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals perceived the Act’s purpose as facilitating preservation of 
historically significant objects.36 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that the Antiquities Act was enacted to promote the public interest in 
protecting American Indian land.37 The court stressed the need to 
protect American Indian sacred places against “commercial plundering” 
to encourage “respect for the culture and heritage of [N]ative 
 
 32.  See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 817 (10th 
Cir. 1999) (stating that government attitudes towards American Indians began to 
change in the 1930s and laws in the last sixty-five years have “valued and 
protected tribal governments and cultures”). 
 33.  The periods discussed in this Note are grouped by the justifications and 
reasoning behind the laws, not necessarily in terms of chronological passage. 
 34.  Yasaitis, supra note 1, at 264–65. 
 35.  Barbara J. Van Arsdale, Validity, Construction, and Application of 
Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 431 et seq., 11 A.L.R. FED. 2D 623 (2006); see 
also Utah Ass’n of Cntys. v. Bush, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1198–99 (D. Utah 2004) 
(stressing the President’s discretion in establishing national monuments, but 
holding that the Antiquities Act does not violate the nondelegation doctrine or 
the Constitution’s Property Clause because it contains clear standards and 
limitations such as the limitation on monument size). 
 36.  Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing 
Vessel, 569 F.2d 330, 341 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 37.  United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113, 114 (9th Cir. 1974). 
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Americans.”38 Nevertheless, the Antiquities Act reinforces the historical 
notion of American Indians as objects of study and protects 
archaeological resources for this purpose.39 
The 1935 Historic Sites Act requires federal agency heads to 
consider the effect of actions on sites listed in the National Register of 
Historic Places.40 The Historic Sites Act now allows protection of some 
American Indian sacred sites by providing that “properties of traditional 
religious and cultural importance to an Indian tribe” may be eligible for 
inclusion on the Register.41 These protections were political when 
enacted, supporting President Roosevelt’s westward expansion goals 
and protecting American Indian objects as natural resources and 
subjects of scientific study.42 Thus, protection is based on the federal 
government’s determination of the site’s significance and not upon any 
positive right of native tribes to protect their property.43 
The 1960 Reservoir Salvage Act protects “historical and 
archaeological data (including relics and specimens)” that might be 
destroyed in dam construction projects.44 This law protects only sites of 
“exceptional significance,”45 and it has overlooked most American 
Indian sites because they were not the focus of larger federal 
government protection efforts.46 
Between 1966 and 1977, Congress passed additional historic 
preservation acts, including the National Historic Preservation Act,47 the 
National Environmental Policy Act,48 and the Surface Mining Control 
and Reclamation Act.49 Importantly, although these acts seek to protect 
historic and archaeological sites, they do not address American Indian 
rights in any significant way.50 
 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  See Yasaitis, supra note 1, at 264. 
 40.  16 U.S.C. § 462 (2012). 
 41.  Kristen A. Carpenter, Real Property and Peoplehood, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 
313, 329 (2008) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 470a–f (Westlaw 2008)). 
 42.  Yasaitis, supra note 1, at 262. 
 43.  See 16 U.S.C. § 470 (2012). 
 44.  Id. § 469. 
 45.  KATHLEEN SUE FINE-DARE, GRAVE INJUSTICE: THE AMERICAN INDIAN 
REPATRIATION MOVEMENT AND NAGPRA 71 (2002) (“Only sites of ‘exceptional 
significance’ were to be preserved . . . .”); Yasaitis, supra note 1, at 264. 
 46.  See Yasaitis, supra note 1, at 264 & n.47 (“[T]he Reservoir Salvage Act did 
very little to protect Native American sites.” (citing MARCUS H. PRICE III, 
DISPUTING THE DEAD: U.S. LAW ON ABORIGINAL REMAINS AND GRAVE GOODS 26 
(1994))). 
 47.  16 U.S.C. § 470. 
 48.  42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012). 
 49.  30 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012). 
 50.  Yasaitis, supra note 1, at 264. 
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The Archaeological Resources Protection Act (ARPA) of 1979 was 
enacted to support the preservation of resources with scientific value51 
and to discourage the lucrative business of illegally trafficking American 
Indian artifacts.52 ARPA gives the federal government flexibility to 
preserve and protect irreplaceable archeological resources.53 To protect 
American Indian resources, the Act attempts to increase cooperation 
between government officials, the archaeological community, and 
private parties.54 Under ARPA: 
No person may excavate, remove, damage, or otherwise alter 
or deface, or attempt to excavate, remove, damage, or 
otherwise alter or deface any archaeological resource located 
on public lands or Indian lands unless such activity is pursuant 
to a permit . . . . No person may sell, purchase, exchange, 
transport, receive, or offer to sell, purchase, or exchange any 
archaeological resource if such resource was excavated or 
removed from public lands or Indian lands in violation of . . . 
Federal law. . . . No person may sell, purchase, exchange, 
transport, receive, or offer to sell, purchase, or exchange, in 
interstate or foreign commerce, any archaeological resource 
excavated, removed, sold, purchased, exchanged, transported, 
or received in violation of any . . . State or local law.55 
One potential issue for tribes relying on ARPA to protect treasures may 
be their age; ARPA defines “archaeological resource” as “material 
remains of past human life or activities” and limits the Act’s reach to 
remains at least one hundred years old.56 Although many other areas of 
confusion have been settled through litigation, confusion persists on 
issues such as mens rea and sentencing.57 Another area of uncertainty is 
the Act’s breadth. While courts applying the Act may focus efforts on 
capturing professional looters, the Act’s application to people who 
inadvertently stumble upon artifacts and pick them up remains 
uncertain.58 
 
 51.  See 16 U.S.C. § 470aa(b). 
 52.  See Jay M. Zitter, Validity, Construction, and Operation of Archaeological 
Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 470aa to 470mm, 184 A.L.R. FED. 
139 (2003) (summarizing the Act’s aims). 
 53.  See 16 U.S.C. § 470aa; Roberto Iraola, The Archaeological Resources 
Protection Act—Twenty Five Years Later, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 221, 222–24 (2004). 
 54.  Iraola, supra note 53, at 222–23. 
 55.  16 U.S.C. § 470ee. 
 56.  Id. § 470bb(1). 
 57.  See Iraola, supra note 53, at 231–44 (discussing mens rea and sentencing 
issues presented by ARPA). 
 58.  See id. at 257 (categorizing the view of ARPA’s reach only to professional 
looters and not to inadvertent looters as only a “trend”). 
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The first laws to consider American Indian perspectives, albeit in a 
limited manner, were the 1992 Amendments to the Historic Preservation 
Act (NHPA).59 The amended NHPA requires every federal agency to 
establish a historic preservation program60 and consult with American 
Indian tribes affected by federal undertakings.61 However, the amended 
NHPA places the burden of proving cultural affiliation on native tribes, 
thereby excluding many critical voices in these debates.62 As will be 
discussed with respect to later legislation, the trend of requiring tribal 
representatives to prove cultural affiliation is one that persists in the 
current cultural property framework.63  
These laws represent the first federal foray into protecting 
American Indian cultural property. Early laws focused primarily on 
furthering external governmental goals or exploiting American Indian 
cultural property for federal needs. While tribes sometimes benefitted 
from these laws, they did little to increase American Indian ownership 
rights or cultural sovereignty. 
B. Working Towards “Modern” Cultural Property Legislation 
Beginning in the 1980s, a new paradigm of cultural property 
legislation emerged. Legislators increasingly focused on American 
Indian concerns and their claims to cultural property. However, while 
federal recognition of American Indian property rights evolved 
significantly in this period, the laws reflect a uniform approach for all 
American Indians. This blanket approach overlooks the religious and 
cultural interests of Alaska Natives that differ from their mainland 
counterparts. 
The 1989 National Museum of the American Indian Act (NMAIA) 
was the first law to successfully address the disposition and return of 
stolen American Indian objects.64 Although the NMAIA applies only to 
the Smithsonian Institution, it “requires the inventory, documentation, 
and in certain instances and upon request, repatriation of Native 
American human remains and funerary objects to the culturally 
affiliated and federally recognized Native American tribe.”65 The 
NMAIA also established a museum with the primary purpose of 
 
 59.  See Yasaitis, supra note 1, at 264–65. 
 60.  16 U.S.C. § 470. 
 61.  Yasaitis, supra note 1, 264–65. 
 62.  Id. at 265. 
 63.  See infra notes 108–113 and accompanying text. 
 64.  Yasaitis, supra note 1, at 264. 
 65.  Id. at 265; see also 20 U.S.C. § 80q-9 (2012). 
KITCHENS.V23 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2012  6:08 PM 
2012 RECLAIMING CULTURAL PROPERTY 123 
preserving and studying American Indian history and artifacts.66 The 
National Museum of the American Indian integrated American Indian 
perspectives into representations of their cultures.67 The NMAIA also 
laid the foundation for an ongoing dialogue between museums and 
American Indian leaders.68 
The 1990 Indian Arts and Crafts Act created an Indian Arts and 
Crafts Board,69 established to promote “the development of American 
Indian and Alaska Native arts and crafts, improving the economic status 
of members of Federally-recognized tribes, and helping to develop and 
expand marketing opportunities for arts and crafts produced by 
American Indians and Alaska Natives.”70 This law, however, focuses on 
economic rather than cultural property rights;71 it aims at eliminating 
the $800 million industry of importing counterfeit American Indian 
objects.72 The Act protects tribes’ economic interests by making it a 
federal felony to “falsely suggest” handmade goods are American 
Indian-made if they are not.73 Only artisans certified by a federally or 
state-recognized tribe are protected under the Act.74 Although 
establishing protection by tribal affiliation may be reasonable from an 
enforcement perspective, enforcement is not straightforward due to 
variations in American Indian enrollment criteria, which tribes define 
independently.75 
A potentially significant step towards international recognition of 
American Indian cultural property rights was the 1993 Mataatua 
Declaration on Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous 
 
 66.  20 U.S.C. § 80q-1; Jon M. Van Dyke, The Political Status of the Native 
Hawaiian People, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 95, 106 n.67 (1998). 
 67.  See Patricia Pierce Erikson, Decolonizing the “Nation’s Attic,” in THE 
NATIONAL MUSEUM OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN: CRITICAL CONVERSATIONS 43, 63 
(Amy Lonetree & Amanda J. Cobb eds., 2008) (discussing how the National 
Museum of the American Indian integrated American Indian perspectives by 
including American Indians on the museum’s governing body). 
 68.  Miranda J. Brady, A Dialogic Response to the Problematized Past: The 
National Museum of the American Indian, in CONTESTING KNOWLEDGE: MUSEUMS & 
INDIGENOUS PERSPECTIVES 133, 133–34 (Susan Sleeper-Smith ed., 2009). 
 69.  25 U.S.C. § 305 (2012). 
 70.  Indian Arts and Crafts Board, 61 Fed. Reg. 54,551, 54,551–52 (Oct. 21, 
1996). 
 71.  See id. 
 72.  William J. Hapiuk, Jr., Of Kitsch and Kachinas: A Critical Analysis of the 
Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1010 (2001). 
 73.  Id. at 1009. 
 74.  Id. at 1012. 
 75.  Id. 
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Peoples.76 The nine tribes of Mataatua in the Bay of Plenty Region of 
Aotearoa, New Zealand convened the First International Conference on 
the Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous People and 
wrote a declaration.77 Indigenous representatives from fourteen 
countries, including the United States, met to discuss issues such as the 
value of indigenous knowledge, biodiversity, arts, music, language, and 
other spiritual and cultural forms.78 The declaration acknowledged that 
“Indigenous Peoples have a commonality of experiences relating to the 
exploitation of their cultural and intellectual property”79 and set a 
potential framework for an internationally unified native front in 
support of repatriation. The representatives stressed that “the first 
beneficiaries of indigenous knowledge (cultural and intellectual 
property rights) must be the direct indigenous descendants of such 
knowledge.”80 The declaration also emphasized that “existing protection 
mechanisms are insufficient for the protection of Indigenous Peoples 
Intellectual and Cultural Property Rights” and called for countries to 
“[a]dopt or strengthen appropriate policies and/or legal instruments 
that will protect indigenous intellectual and cultural property and the 
right to preserve customary and administrative systems and practices.”81 
This declaration did not focus on the religious or economic significance 
of American Indian objects.82 Instead, the text suggests a moral rights 
philosophy at the declaration’s core,83 which may impose significant 
hurdles should the U.S. attempt to implement the declaration’s 
recommendations into its existing legal framework.84 Regardless, the 
 
 76.  See The Mataatua Declaration on Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, ALASKA NATIVE KNOWLEDGE NETWORK (June 1993), 
http://www.ankn.uaf.edu/IKS/mataatua.html. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  See id. 
 83.  Although the declaration’s text does not outwardly espouse a moral 
rights basis, the text suggests this type of philosophy may lurk in the 
background. See id. (emphasizing the “fundamental rights” of indigenous 
peoples to “control” traditional knowledge and stressing that “indigenous 
peoples are the guardians of their customary knowledge and have the right to 
protect and control dissemination of that knowledge,” thereby suggesting these 
rights as inherent to the artists). 
 84.  The United States has never adopted a moral rights justification 
underlying intellectual property rights. MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING 
COPYRIGHT LAW § 8.29[A], at 389 (5th ed. 2005). This Note does not argue that 
reconciling the Mataatua Declaration’s philosophical underpinnings and the 
American legal framework is impossible, only that it may pose a potential 
obstacle if implementation is considered seriously. 
KITCHENS.V23 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2012  6:08 PM 
2012 RECLAIMING CULTURAL PROPERTY 125 
declaration may play an important role in shaping American Indian 
tribal attitudes about their ownership rights. 
In addition to the enumerated laws, the federal government has 
implemented committees and agencies to address issues pertaining to 
American Indian cultural property over the last few decades. For 
example, the Cultural Heritage Center, a branch of the U.S. Department 
of State, “supports the foreign affairs functions of the U.S. Department 
of State related to the protection and preservation of cultural heritage.”85 
This branch administers American responsibilities relating to the 1970 
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit 
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.86 It also 
administers the U.S. Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation, the 
Iraq Cultural Heritage Initiative, and special cultural heritage 
programs.87 This branch does not focus solely or even primarily on 
American Indian issues. 
American Indian cultural protection was first grounded in federal 
economic concerns over American Indian resources. While early laws 
did not significantly address American Indian protection of their own 
cultural property, later laws have focused on the religious need of tribes 
to control their cultural property. This requires the government to 
decide what is spiritually important to a vastly diverse group. Alaska 
Natives may be especially disadvantaged because their religions and 
cultures differ significantly from mainland tribes. This problem persists 
in today’s most important laws concerning American Indian cultural 
property. 
C. “Modern” Cultural Property Legislation 
American Indians’ current cultural property rights are grounded 
primarily in two laws. The significant changes in the treatment of 
cultural property and repatriation embodied in these laws grew in large 
part from changing political views of American Indians. These laws 
represent a substantial shift from laws grounded in economic or 
religious concerns. 
1. Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) is a law central to many 
current cultural property claims. MBTA makes it: 
 
 85.  Cultural Heritage Center, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF EDUC. 
AND CULTURAL AFF., http://exchanges.state.gov/heritage/index.html (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2012). 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
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[U]nlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to 
pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or 
kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, offer to 
purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export, import, 
cause to be shipped, exported, or imported, deliver for 
transportation, transport or cause to be transported, carry or 
cause to be carried, or receive for shipment, transportation, 
carriage, or export, any migratory bird, any part, nest, or egg of 
any such bird, or any product, whether or not manufactured, 
which consists, or is composed in whole or part, of any such 
bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof . . . .88 
In protecting migratory birds, MBTA implements treaties between the 
United States and several foreign countries.89 Under MBTA, migratory 
birds cannot be killed without the Secretary of the Interior’s 
authorization.90 Tribes can employ MBTA when objects they hope to 
repatriate contain feathers or portions of migratory birds. However, this 
law extends only to those tribes and artists using feathers and birds as 
part of their religious, artistic, and cultural expression. 
2. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act 
The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act 
(NAGPRA) of 199091 is the most important current law pertaining to 
American Indian cultural property.92 Congress enacted NAGPRA to 
achieve two principal objectives: “to protect American Indian human 
remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural 
patrimony presently on Federal or tribal lands; and to repatriate Native 
American human remains, associated funerary objects, sacred objects, 
and objects of cultural patrimony currently held or controlled by Federal 
agencies and museums.”93 Those approving NAGPRA were acutely 
aware of its impact on museums. Speaking before the Senate on October 
26, 1990, Senator John McCain, co-chair of the Senate Select Committee 
on Indian Affairs, urged his colleagues to pass NAGPRA, saying, “The 
passage of this legislation marks the end of a long process for many 
 
 88.  16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2012). 
 89.  James Lockhart, Validity, Construction, and Application of Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 703 to 712, and its Implementing Regulations, 3 A.L.R. 
FED. 2D 465 (2005). 
 90.  16 U.S.C. § 703(a); Larry Martin Corcoran, Migratory Bird Treaty Act: 
Strict Criminal Liability for Non-Hunting, Human Caused Bird Deaths, 77 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 315, 315–16 (1999). 
 91.  25 U.S.C. § 3001 (2012). 
  92.  Harding, supra note 11, at 728. 
 93.  United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 799–800 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing 
H.R. REP. NO. 101-877 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4367, 4368–69). 
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Indian tribes and museums. The subject of repatriation is charged with 
high emotions in both the Native American community and the 
museum community. I believe this bill represents a true compromise.”94 
NAGPRA is the source of the majority of American Indian cultural 
property claims because it is the only true American Indian cultural 
property rights legislation to date.95 It establishes the only mechanism 
for cultural property repatriation.96 Upon enactment, NAGPRA 
represented a startling policy shift—American Indian tribes were, for the 
first time, able to bring legitimate claims for the return of objects long 
housed in museum collections.97 NAGPRA was justified by the 
constitutionally recognized tribal sovereignty of American Indian tribes 
and growing recognition of the “government-to-government” 
relationship between the federal government and tribes.98 
NAGPRA protects human remains, funerary objects, sacred items, 
and objects of cultural patrimony.99 As such, it requires a property rights 
determination.100 The Act provides for repatriation of items previously 
regarded as government property as long as the items were owned by 
the tribe at the time of alienation.101 Additionally, NAGPRA establishes 
a disclosure mechanism for items in federal repositories and museums 
receiving federal funding.102 Institutions must prepare summaries, 
including statements of cultural affiliation, of all currently owned 
American Indian cultural items, human remains, and funerary items and 
distribute the list to federally recognized tribes that could have a 
property interest in them.103 
Today, NAGPRA is the source of widespread repatriation threats 
for museums.104 The net effect of the law is to permit government 
agencies and museums to retain objects of cultural patrimony only if 
they can trace title back to a voluntary transfer by a culturally-affiliated 
 
 94.  136 CONG. REC. 35677 (1990) (statement of Sen. John McCain). 
 95.  See Harding, supra note 11, at 723 (“Museums and agencies that 
previously had no reason to doubt the security of their entitlements now face 
the prospect of the loss of significant objects. . . . [NAGPRA] represents a 
significant policy shift, enabling Native Americans to reclaim cultural items 
that have long been in the custody of others.”). 
 96.  See id. 
 97.  See id. 
 98.  C. Timothy McKeown and Sherry Hutt, In the Smaller Scope of 
Conscience: The N ative American Graves Protection & Repatriation Act Twelve Years 
After, 21 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 153, 155 (2003). 
  99.  See 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3) (2012). 
 100.  See id. § 3002. 
 101.  See id. § 3005. 
 102.  Id. § 3003. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Harding, supra note 11, at 728. 
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tribe.105 NAGPRA also contains a criminal component punishing anyone 
who “knowingly sells, purchases, uses for profit, or transports for sale or 
profit” American Indian human remains or cultural items without 
permission.106 Although NAGPRA made strides in expanding tribal 
protection, tribes and individuals bear the burden of establishing 
standing to bring suit, and the law is highly technical, as will be 
discussed in the following section. 
NAGPRA has also created significant confusion. One source of 
confusion is the scope of protection. NAGPRA does not treat religious 
items equally.107 NAGPRA distinguishes between various types of 
“cultural items,” “human remains,” “associated” and “unassociated 
funerary objects,” “sacred objects,” and “cultural patrimony.”108 Each 
category has a different repatriation procedure. “Cultural patrimony” is 
defined as: 
[A]n object having ongoing historical, traditional, or cultural 
importance central to the Native American group or culture 
itself, rather than property owned by an individual Native 
American, and which, therefore, cannot be alienated, 
appropriated, or conveyed by any individual regardless of 
whether or not the individual is a member of the Indian tribe or 
Native Hawaiian organization and such object shall have been 
considered inalienable by such Native American group at the 
time the object was separated from such group.109 
Only native tribes and organizations may request objects of cultural 
patrimony, and the tribe or organization must establish tribal 
affiliation.110 Tribes are not consistent in membership requirements, and 
as a result, this provision applies differently to each tribe. Lineal 
descendants have priority over tribes and organizations in requesting 
funerary objects, sacred objects, and human remains, but proving a 
direct lineal relationship is often extremely difficult or impossible.111 In 
some cases, especially cases of contested ownership, an object’s 
importance rather than ownership will dictate repatriation.112 This yields 
additional uncertainty for tribes.113 NAGPRA has been the source of 
 
 105.  Id. at 729. 
 106.  18 U.S.C. § 1170(a) (2012). 
 107.  Harding, supra note 11, at 723. 
 108.  25 U.S.C. § 3001(3) (2012); McKeown & Hutt, supra note 98, at 163. 
 109.  25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(D). 
 110.  McKeown & Hutt, supra note 98, at 160. 
 111.  See id. 
 112.  Harding, supra note 11, at 725. 
 113.  Id. 
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considerable litigation since its enactment, and through the years, the 
Act’s complexity and nuance has increased. 
III. NAGPRA IN PRACTICE: COMPLEXITY AND UNCERTAINTY FOR 
POTENTIAL CLAIMANTS 
American Indian cultural property rights have evolved 
tremendously from laws focusing on the economic need to exploit 
American Indian resources to NAGPRA. The motivations behind 
NAGPRA stem not only from a continued tradition of American Indians 
as outsiders to the political, economic, and cultural elite, but also from a 
shared reaction to a history of injustice experienced by many native 
communities.114 Although taking American Indians as an entire class 
under the wing of “cultural patrimony” affirms the group’s outsider 
status, the special treatment is beneficial where it provides for return of 
indispensable cultural items to their rightful owners. The problems with 
NAGPRA are not the result of ill intent by lawmakers;115 rather, the law 
is problematic because it is applied uniformly to groups that differ 
significantly in terms of resources, organization, religion, culture, and 
history. 
NAGPRA’s litigation record reveals NAGPRA is a complicated law 
that is not easily navigated. Although some tribes have been successful 
in utilizing NAGPRA, one scholar writes, “[W]ith the law’s passage, 
tribal groups quickly realized it was not the panacea they hoped it 
would be, and Indians quickly spoke out on the inadequacies and 
ambiguities of NAGPRA.”116 A brief look at the litigation record reveals 
how complex the law has become and, as a result, how important 
external factors such as tribal organization and access to political and 
economic resources are in determining whether tribes are able to take 
advantage of the law and repatriate stolen goods. 
As one NAGPRA litigation survey records, “[I]t is easy to 
understand what the law does, but not quite as easy to understand 
when the law applies or to whom.”117 Legal standing is one hurdle that 
is often difficult to navigate. NAGPRA’s implementing regulations 
make clear who has standing to bring a claim,118 but even those who 
meet the statutory requirements are often subject to challenge based on 
 
 114.  See Yasaitis, supra note 1, at 266. 
 115.  See id. at 266–67. 
 116.  JOE WATKINS, INDIGENOUS ARCHAEOLOGY: AMERICAN INDIAN VALUES AND 
SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE 62 (2000). 
 117.  Yasaitis, supra note 1, at 269. 
 118.  43 C.F.R. § 10.2(b) (2011). 
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whether they suffered an injury in fact or whether the wrong is within 
NAGPRA’s zone of interest, as seen through a sampling of cases.119 Even 
if the property is clearly damaged by a defendant’s action, the plaintiff 
still may lack standing in many cases if the court does not find the 
requisite descendent or cultural relationship. Proving this relationship 
can be equally complex and uncertain. For example, in Idrogo v. United 
States Army,120 the plaintiffs did not have standing to repatriate a 
Chiricahua Apache’s remains, lift his prisoner of war status, or provide 
him with military honors despite clear harm because they could not 
establish the required relationship.121 
Many conflicts responding to NAGPRA reflect social tensions 
between members of very different cultures with very different beliefs. 
In Na Iwo O Na Kupuna O Mokapu v. Dalton,122 the court disagreed with 
the plaintiff’s contention that human remains themselves can have 
standing.123 The court suggested that to give human remains standing, at 
the very least the plaintiff would have to demonstrate a benefit to living 
society members.124 One scholar argues that such clashes are inevitable 
in these cases because NAGPRA relies on cultures “reconciling 
irreconcilable interests and ideas” about culture, human rights, race, 
spirituality, and science.125 “The clash in perspectives created by 
NAGPRA is necessitated by the statute’s very nature as a Western legal 
construct.”126 Any legislation bridging cultures causes an inevitable 
culture clash, and NAGPRA is no different, incorporating “questionable 
assumptions” about the cultures and religions that the Act purports to 
 
 119.  In Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. Brownlee, the court held that the tribe’s fears 
were merely “speculative,” and that a fear of harm would not substitute for the 
actual harm necessary to provide the grounds for standing. 331 F.3d 912, 915–16 
(D.C. Cir. 2003). However, in Abenaki Nation of Mississquoi v. Hughes, the court 
dismissed an American Indian group’s claim as “premature” despite the threat 
that the federal permit in question would raise spillway elevation and possibly 
destroy remains and cultural items. 805 F. Supp. 234, 252 (D. Vt. 1992), aff’d, 990 
F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 120.  18 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 121.  Id. at 28–29. 
 122.  894 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Haw. 1995). 
 123.  Id. at 1408. The court denied the remains standing because it found that 
the plaintiffs could not show that the remains suffered an injury and that the 
defendants caused that injury. Id. at 1407–08. 
 124.  See id. at 1407. 
 125.  Matthew J. Petrich, Litigating NAGPRA in Hawai’i: Dignity or Debacle?, 22 
U. HAW. L. REV. 545, 561 (2000). 
 126.  Id. 
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protect.127 NAGPRA’s complex language compounds these problems, 
making effective use of the law even more difficult.128 
Standing is only one difficult legal issue faced by NAGPRA in its 
short history. Failure to exhaust all available administrative remedies 
also threatens cases.129 Determining whether administrative remedies 
have been exhausted can be both time-intensive and expensive for 
prospective plaintiffs. Additionally, inadvertent discoveries of cultural 
items or human remains pose uncertainty for prospective claimants. For 
NAGPRA to apply, discovery must take place under certain 
circumstances.130 
Subject matter jurisdiction also poses a problem for many bringing 
suit because NAGPRA applies only to federal or tribal lands.131 
Discoveries on non-federal and non-tribal land must be governed by 
state and local burial laws if they are to be protected at all.132 This rule 
adds confusion when an object was discovered on property that was not 
federally owned at the time of discovery, but, before the NAGPRA suit, 
became federally owned.133 Even if this hurdle is met, courts can dismiss 
many claims for definitional reasons.134 As in other areas, religious and 
cultural beliefs likely result in different understandings of key 
definitions, and tribes may not be equally satisfied with this result. 
 
 127.  See id. at 563 (arguing that NAGPRA makes “questionable assumptions” 
about Hawai’ian native culture). 
 128.  Id. at 563–64. 
 129.  See, e.g., Na Iwo O Na Kupuna O Mokapu, 894 F. Supp. at 1405–06; see also 
Yasaitis, supra note 1, at 273–74. 
 130.  See Yasaitis, supra note 1, at 276. This issue was discussed in San Carlos 
Apache Tribe v. United States, where the court insisted that “NAGPRA is not 
prospective” and therefore it cannot protect objects underwater if they were not 
visible even if the government agency knew or should have known that their 
actions would cause damage. 272 F. Supp. 2d 860, 889–94 (D. Ariz. 2003), aff’d, 
417 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2005). The court distinguished this from the case of 
Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, where the court held 
that human remains and cultural items in a cemetery were inadvertently 
discovered as a result of a flood control operation. 83 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1056 (D. 
S.D. 2000). 
 131.  See Romero v. Becken, 256 F.3d 349, 354 (5th Cir. 2001) (dismissing the 
plaintiff’s claim based on property found on municipal lands and limiting 
NAGPRA’s application to “federal or tribal lands”). 
 132.  McKeown & Hutt, supra note 98, at 168. 
 133.  See, e.g., Monet v. Lee, Henderson & Wong, Nos. Civ. 94-00884 HG, Civ. 
95-00300, 1995 WL 774527, at *1, 8 (D. Haw. Oct. 30, 1995) (involving property 
federally owned at the time of litigation but not federally owned when the 
property was discovered). 
 134.  See, e.g., Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas v. Chacon, 46 F. Supp. 2d 
644, 650 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (finding the fact that “human remains” are statutorily 
within the category of “cultural items” suggests recently buried corpses with no 
“particular cultural or anthropological interest” are not covered by NAGPRA). 
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The so-called “Kennewick Man Case” is a prime example of the 
difficulties surrounding NAGPRA that have yet to be resolved.135 This 
case involved ancient human remains—estimated to be between 8,340 
and 9,200 years old—discovered in 1966 on the Columbia River in 
Kennewick, Washington on land controlled by the Army Corps of 
Engineers.136 Although the skeleton was originally believed to be of 
European descent, it was later studied and showed characteristics that 
did not conform only to American Indian or European skeletons.137 
While the Smithsonian Institution’s National Museum of Natural 
History sought to acquire the skeleton for scientific study, American 
Indian tribes argued for return and reburial.138 The government agreed 
with the tribe and halted testing pursuant to NAGPRA.139 Scientists 
brought suit in district court.140 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
ultimately affirmed the lower court’s decision, preventing transfer of the 
remains to tribal representatives.141 The court based this conclusion on 
the finding that NAGPRA did not apply.142 As a result, the Smithsonian 
scientists should be permitted to continue their studies.143 The court 
found that American Indian claimants must establish a relationship 
between the claimed remains and a “presently existing tribe.”144 
Ultimately, the court did not find the tribe’s oral histories persuasive 
and concluded that the interest in scientific progress should prevail.145 
The controversy is not likely to end soon.146 This case leaves cultural 
property scholars and American Indian tribes with a multitude of 
unanswered questions, not only about who can bring suit under 
NAGPRA and the requisite level of proof, but also about the law’s 
ultimate purpose and its role going forward. 
Beyond its complex framework, some argue NAGPRA is 
inadequate to confront issues facing American Indians today. NAGPRA 
applies only to federally recognized tribes, and federal courts have 
consistently affirmed the authority to determine membership as one of 
tribes’ most basic powers. While defining “American Indian” by those 
officially enrolled appears to be an easy line to draw, some tribes believe 
 
 135.  Yasaitis, supra note 1, at 283–84. 
 136.  Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 868–69 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 137.  Id. at 869. 
 138.  Id. at 870. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. at 871. 
 141.  Id. at 882. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. at 879. 
 145.  Id. at 881–82. 
 146.  Yasaitis, supra note 1, at 284–85. 
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the distinction between federally recognized and unrecognized tribes is 
unimportant while other tribes fear allowing NAGPRA to apply to 
unrecognized tribes would undermine the federal recognition process.147 
Additionally, tribes often have different membership criteria,148 making 
this distinction somewhat arbitrary. 
These areas represent only a sampling of the complexities and 
nuances within the NAGPRA cannon and demonstrate the difficulty 
and unpredictability faced by tribes and individuals hoping to protect 
cultural or human remains. While not all NAGPRA cases are as 
complicated as these issues suggest and the majority settle before trial,149 
NAGPRA remains extremely complicated for tribes and lawyers hoping 
to use the law. Because of NAGPRA’s complexity, political and 
economic resources, tribal organization and cohesion, and significant 
tribal size are key to successful navigation of the law. Because tribes 
differ greatly, they have unequal access to repatriation and control of 
their cultural property. Cultural property rights are, in practice, reserved 
only for a small minority of tribes. Although instructional materials are 
available online to help tribal representatives through the NAGPRA 
process,150 the materials are introductory. Tribes cannot be reasonably 
expected to direct themselves through the NAGPRA maze without 
considerable guidance and resources. 
IV. PAST AND POTENTIAL NAGPRA CLAIMS BY ALASKA 
NATIVES 
Although NAGPRA was enacted to protect historically 
marginalized groups and their interests, the current framework cannot 
adequately protect the tremendously diverse American Indian 
population. As each NAGPRA case brings added legal nuance, the law 
becomes even less accessible to certain groups within the American 
Indian community. Furthermore, American Indian beliefs may not 
necessarily correspond to the statute’s provisions or courts’ 
interpretations of actual harm and who has suffered it.151 For Alaska 
 
 147.  WATKINS, supra note 116, at 65. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Yasaitis, supra note 1, at 284. 
 150.  See, e.g., National NAGPRA: Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L PARK 
SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov/nagpra/FAQ/INDEX.HTM (last visited Feb. 12, 
2012). 
 151.  See Na Iwo O Na Kupuna O Mokapu v. Dalton, 894 F. Supp. 1397, 1402–
03, 1406–07 (D. Haw. 1995) (suggesting this problem in the context of native 
Hawai’ian art). 
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Native communities, the complexity of the current legal structure 
reduces the ability to protect or recapture cultural property. 
A. Alaska’s Relative Silence in the NAGPRA Discourse 
Undoubtedly, Congress did not intend to confine NAGPRA and its 
precursors to American Indian claimants located within the forty-eight 
contiguous states.152 Alaska’s substantial and thriving native community 
was intended to benefit from NAGPRA’s protections.153 In 1999, the 
Census Bureau estimated that 101,352 Alaska Natives lived within the 
state’s borders.154 The Alaska Native population constituted 16.4% of the 
state’s total population, placing Alaska among the states with the 
highest percentages of native population.155 
Additionally, Alaska does not fall short in terms of federal land.156 
NAGPRA applies only to discoveries made on federal lands and defines 
“federal lands” as “any land other than tribal lands which are controlled 
or owned by the United States, including lands selected by but not yet 
conveyed to Alaska Native Corporations and groups organized 
pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971.”157 Instead 
of the reservation organization for many state’s American Indian 
populations, Alaska is organized into native villages.158 Under the 1971 
Settlement Act, Alaska Native tribes received forty million acres to be 
divided into 220 native villages and twelve regional corporations 
established by the Act.159 Although NAGPRA does not apply to these 
 
 152.  Bonnichsen v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1136 (D. Or. 2002), 
aff’d and remanded, 357 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2004), opinion amended and superseded on 
denial of reh’g, 367 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  States Ranked by American Indian and Alaska Native Population, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (July 1, 1999), http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/ 
state/rank/aiea.txt. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL LANDS 
AND INDIAN RESERVATIONS (2003), available at http://www.nationalatlas.gov/ 
printable/images/pdf/fedlands/AK.pdf. 
 157.  25 U.S.C. § 3001 (2012). 
 158.  American Indian Areas/Alaska Native Areas/Hawaiian Home Lands 
Cartographic Boundary Files Descriptions & Metadata, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/geo/www/cob/na_metadata.html (last visited Jan. 
10, 2011). 
 159.  Richard S. Jones, Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 (Public Law 
92-203): History and Analysis Together with Subsequent Amendments, ALASKOOL.ORG 
(June 1, 1981), http://www.alaskool.org/projects/ancsa/reports/rsjones1981/ 
ANCSA_History71.htm. 
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lands, Alaska’s other vast federally owned areas could support viable 
NAGPRA claims.160 
Despite Alaska’s thriving native population and vast amounts of 
federally owned land, Alaska Natives have been underrepresented in 
the NAGPRA and cultural property discourse. A thorough search 
through major legal databases reveals no trace of any Alaskans filing 
suit under NAGPRA, despite Alaska’s 229 federally recognized tribes161 
and a host of unrecognized tribes.162 In contrast, searches for NAGPRA 
suits brought by individual and tribal representatives from some large 
mainland tribes produce a number of results.163 
Alaska Native groups have only one traceable instance of engaging 
in repatriation efforts. In the recent dispute between Tlingit 
representatives and the University of Pennsylvania Museum of 
Archaeology, Hoonah Indian Association and Huna Totem sought to 
repatriate forty-five items owned by the museum for eighty-seven 
years.164 The Tlingit representatives claimed that the tribal leader from 
whom the museum administration purchased the items did not have 
authority to sell the collection without unanimous clan consent.165 The 
museum argued the objects were fairly purchased.166 The six-person 
NAGPRA review committee unanimously concluded the museum 
should return all Tlingit artifacts, leaving the option for further 
negotiations or litigation.167 So far, the museum has returned eight 
objects to the T’akdeintaan Clan of Hoonah.168 The remaining objects’ 
fates remain uncertain.169 This return was achieved following sixteen 
years of work by relevant tribal representatives.170 
 
 160.  Cf. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 156. 
 161.  Alaska Region Overview, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, 
http://www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre/RegionalOffices/Alaska/index.htm (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
 162.  Alaska Indians: Alaskan Villages, Native Communities and Alaskan Tribes 
from A to Z Index, AAA NATIVE ARTS, http://www.aaanativearts.com/alaskan-
natives/alaska-indians.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
 163.  A search of major legal databases for NAGPRA suits brought by the 
Apache tribe and tribal representatives yields many recorded court opinions. 
Sioux and Pueblo cultural representatives have similarly made a number of 
efforts to take advantage of NAGPRA. 
 164.  Molly Petrilla, Tlingit Claim on Museum Objects Triggers Federal Scrutiny, 
THE PA. GAZETTE, Mar.–Apr. 2011, at 22. 
 165.  Id. at 22–23. 
 166.  Id. at 24. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Jonathan Grass, Cultural Objects Returning to Hoonah after 80 Years, 
JUNEAU EMPIRE, Feb. 8, 2011, http://juneauempire.com/stories/020811/ 
loc_782430748. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. 
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This success may encourage future NAGPRA actions. For instance, 
the Central Council Tlingit and Haida Indian Tribes of Alaska recently 
received a $90,000 grant from the National Park Service to conduct 
research and prepare NAGPRA claims.171 However, other large native 
cultures, as well as smaller native cultures in Alaska, have not yet made 
any traceable efforts to recover cultural property under NAPGRA or any 
other cultural property law. 
Theoretically, Alaska Natives should be able to take advantage of 
NAGPRA. Importantly, Alaska appears to be furthest behind in 
NAGPRA efforts when compared to other states with large native 
populations. Even outside the contiguous United States, Hawai’ian 
tribes have raised NAGPRA claims to protect their cultural heritage.172 
So why have Alaska’s tribes been a sleeping giant? Alaska Native 
cultural objects are certainly widespread enough outside of Alaska to 
suggest that there are likely some cultural items to which NAGPRA 
could apply. 
B. Alaska Native Art and Artifacts in Prominent U.S. Collections 
and the Art Market 
Alaska Native art is an important part of American national 
identity, which is reflected by its presence in many of the nation’s 
prominent art museums. Although the number of works in each 
museum does not accurately reflect the number of viable NAGPRA 
claims, the number highlights the frequency with which Alaska Native 
works are traded outside of Alaska. 
New York’s Metropolitan Museum of Art houses several dozen 
Alaskan Inuit and Alaskan Yup’ik items173 between the “Arts of Africa, 
Oceana, and the Americas” and “Musical Instruments” sections. At least 
twenty-eight objects are listed as having likely Alaskan Eskimo origin, 
and thirty are listed as having likely Alaskan Tlingit origin.174 Many 
other objects are labeled as having Alaska Native origin but lack native 
 
 171.  Staff Report, CCTHITA Receives Grant Geared Toward Artifact Repatriation, 
JUNEAU EMPIRE, July 19, 2011, http://juneauempire.com/local/2011-07-
19/ccthita-receives-grant-geared-toward-artifact-repatiration. 
 172.  See, e.g., Na Iwo O Na Kupuna O Mokapu v. Dalton, 894 F. Supp. 1397, 
1402–03 (D. Haw. 1995). 
 173.  See Collections Search for “Alaska,” METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART, 
http://www.metmuseum.org/collections/search-the-collections?ft=Alaska (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2012). 
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The lot sold for $62,500.193 Similarly, Sotheby’s holds regular American 
Indian Art auctions.194 Their October 2006 sale of American Indian art 
was the highest grossing auction of American Indian art ever.195 
 Alaska Native art’s popularity is undeniable. However, so far few 
native cultures have made traceable efforts to repatriate important 
pieces of Alaskan heritage. At least in Alaska, NAGPRA is not being 
used to bring claims for the return of objects that have long been part of 
museum collections.196 One issue may be that to assess a NAGPRA 
claim, each individual work of art or cultural artifact must be 
thoroughly researched to determine provenance, location, age, and 
additional background facts, requiring substantial amounts of both time 
and financial resources.197 However, there are other possible reasons for 
Alaska’s relative silence in the NAGPRA discourse; these are explored in 
the following section. 
V. WHY NOT ALASKA? 
A.  Possible Reasons for Alaska’s Relative Silence in NAGPRA 
Discourse 
 Alaska Native art is spread across the nation’s major American 
museums, and this has not gone undetected by living members of 
Alaska Native tribes. A number of possible theories may explain 
Alaska’s relative silence in the NAGPRA discourse. The theories are not 
mutually exclusive—the true culprit is likely a combination of the 
theories. 
 One possible explanation for Alaska’s silence is that Alaska Native 
individuals and cultural groups know about their cultural property 
rights and do not want to bring suits. Cultural representatives could, 
additionally, believe none of their cultural objects qualify for 
 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  See American Indian Art Records and Notables, SOTHEBY’S, 
http://www.sothebys.com/en/departments/american-indian-art/records.html 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2012). 
 195. See id. The sale grossed over seven million dollars. SOTHEBY’S, THE 
DUNDAS COLLECTION OF NORTHWEST COAST AMERICAN INDIAN ART AUCTION 
RESULTS (2006), available at http://www.sothebys.com/en/auctions/ 
results.sale.pdf/2006/the-dundas-collection-of-northwest-coast-american-
indian-art-n08268.pdf. 
 196. See supra Part IV.A. 
 197. See Chip Colwell-Chanthaphonh, Remains Unknown: Repatriating 
Culturally Unaffiliated Human Remains, ANTHROPOLOGY NEWS, Mar. 2010, at 8 
(discussing the expense of NAGPRA provenance research with respect to objects 
of uncertain cultural affiliation).  
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repatriation. Without research into provenance of native art and objects 
cultural representatives have no way of reliably knowing whether 
objects may qualify for return. 
 Another possible explanation is that Alaska Native leaders and 
those able to bring suit may not be adequately aware of their cultural 
property rights. Alaska Natives’ silence may not be based on any form 
of apathy on the part of native leaders but, instead, on a lack of 
knowledge that native cultures are able to bring suit. If this explanation 
is true, it may be due to the fact that the cultural property community 
has historically been focused outward on international issues.198 Perhaps 
native cultures that are furthest removed from the central debates are 
simply unaware that repatriation is an option. The previous case law 
may play a role in bolstering this unawareness, as these native cultures 
may see other larger, more centralized cultural groups bringing suit and 
believe the law does not protect smaller cultural groups in the same 
way. Until Alaska Natives and their representatives engage in 
widespread repatriation activities, these claims may be off the radars of 
relevant political players. 
 Some native cultures may be silent based on a lack of federal 
recognition, a prerequisite to the law’s current protection.199 While 
recognition may explain the silence of the unrecognized native cultures 
currently calling Alaska home, this leaves over 200 federally recognized 
groups that have not questioned the status of their cultural property in 
any traceable way.200 Recognition does, however, raise important issues 
of resources and protection, as those who are not afforded official status 
are not protected and must endure costly negotiations and private 
agreements if they wish to achieve the same results possible through 
NAGPRA. 
 Legal access may also prevent Alaska Natives from bringing suit to 
recover art and cultural artifacts. Because NAGPRA and other relevant 
laws are extremely complicated and nuanced, lawyers bringing these 
claims must have a thorough understanding of the law. Some lawyers 
specialize only in NAGPRA litigation.201 Lawyers who deal primarily in 
this area often belong to firms that dedicate entire practice teams to 
 
 198.  See supra Part I. 
 199.  See 25 U.S.C. § 3001(7) (2012) (defining “Indian tribe” as “any tribe, 
band, nation, or other organized group or community of Indians, including any 
Alaska Native village (as defined in, or established pursuant to, the Alaska 
Native Claims Settlement Act)”). 
 200.  Alaska Region Overview, supra note 161. 
 201.  See, e.g., Litigation Matters, FREDERICKS, PEEBLES & MORGAN, LLP,  
http://www.ndnlaw.com/litigation_matters.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2011) 
(exemplifying law firms that specialize in NAGPRA litigation). 
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NAGPRA litigation. Specialized groups of lawyers are centered mainly 
in regions with larger, more centralized cultural groups and tribes in 
order to make significant profits.202 Not only do area lawyers encourage 
local residents to bring suit, but firms specializing in cultural property 
likely also raise local awareness about the importance of cultural 
property and its applicability to local interests. A search for firms 
specializing in NAGPRA litigation in Alaska or individual attorneys 
practicing in the state with NAGPRA expertise yielded no results. Also, 
because Alaska is the only state without a law school, less legal scholarly 
attention may be devoted to this topic in Alaska. 
 Access to resources may also help explain why some cultural 
groups and tribes are able to bring suit and others are not. Because 
litigation is expensive, the law favors tribes with significant resources. 
The cost of bringing suit may prevent some native cultures from 
bringing action even if they are aware of their legal rights and would 
like to litigate. 
 State legislation also may play a role in a native culture’s ability to 
bring suit. Some states, particularly those that are home to large tribes, 
have parallel state legislation to NAGPRA.203 Parallel state legislation, 
such as the framework in Arizona, where a high percentage of the 
population belongs to large American Indian tribes, reinforces and 
protects interests on a state level.204 This legislation also serves the 
important role of garnering attention for cultural property rights 
generally, allowing local residents to become more cognizant of the 
current state of the law, its application, and how it may benefit them. By 
contrast, Alaska Natives can depend only on federal law. 
 Religious views may also play a vital role in determining who 
brings suit. NAGPRA favors those with very specific religious 
ideologies and requires judges to make decisions based on what kind of 
objects we, as a national culture, value, even if the objects are tied to 
religious expression. Other relevant laws follow this trend as well, such 
as the Migratory Bird and Treaty Act, which will likely go untouched by 
tribes or cultural groups that do not place religious or cultural 
significance on migratory birds. Current cultural property laws were 
drafted by people largely outside the American Indian community and 
 
 202.  See id. 
 203.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-844 (2011); see also Hon. Sherry Hutt, 
Native American Cultural Property Law Human Rights Legislation, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Jan. 
1998, http://www.myazbar.org/AZAttorney/Archives/Jan98/1-98a3.htm 
(discussing the Arizona statute that was enacted to serve as a state counterpart 
to NAGPRA). 
 204.  See Hutt, supra note 203. 
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may not adequately account for differences in religion across American 
Indian tribes and cultures. 
 Additionally, Alaska Natives may not be culturally and politically 
predisposed to utilize cultural property laws. The Alaskan political 
climate is often characterized by a distrust of government intervention 
into private matters.205 NAGPRA and its precursors, which govern 
ownership rights in art works often created by individuals thousands of 
miles away, reek of government intervention. Even though these laws 
could be used to bolster the private property rights of individuals and 
groups within Alaska, this may still be a cultural hurdle. 
 Although museums are required to disclose cultural items in their 
collections, not all museums have completed this process. As a result, 
the statuses of countless American Indian objects hang in limbo. Given 
funding constraints for museums, it may be years before the disclosure 
is completed. 
 Even when museum disclosures have been completed, tribes must 
know what to do with this information and must have the resources to 
thoroughly investigate sometimes impossible provenance records. As 
discussed previously, the law is extremely nuanced, complex, and 
unpredictable. As a result, larger, centrally organized cultural groups 
and tribes may be better equipped to take full advantage of these laws. 
Although many Alaska Native cultures are large and have an imposing 
presence, 229 are spread across the state.206 In 2009, Alaska Native 
cultures comprised approximately two-fifths of the total number of 
federally recognized cultural groups and tribes in the entire country.207 
While American Indian groups dedicated to forging coalitions to face 
difficult issues exist,208 the Alaska Native community presently has no 
large group of cultural representatives dedicated to issues of cultural 
property and repatriation. Boards dedicated to these issues exist on a 
national level,209 but Alaska does not have any similar boards on a state 
level. Although many other large cultural groups and tribes have been 
able to bring NAGPRA claims without these types of boards, the 
 
 205.  See Gregory S. Fisher, Law in the Last Frontier: Commemorating the District 
of Alaska’s 50th Anniversary, 34 AK BAR RAG 19, 19 (2010). 
 206.  Alaska Region Overview, supra note 161. 
 207.  Maria Shaa Tláa Williams, Alaska and Its People: An Introduction, in THE 
ALASKA NATIVE READER 1, 2 (Maria Shaa Tláa Williams ed., 2009). 
 208.  See, e.g., ALASKA NATIVE HEALTH BOARD, http://www.anhb.org (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2011) (addressing health issues facing the Alaska Native 
population); AM. INDIAN ALASKA NATIVE TOURISM ASS’N, http://www.aianta.org 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2011) (discussing issues pertaining to tourism). 
 209.  See, e.g., Indian Arts and Crafts Board, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, 
http://www.doi.gov/iacb/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2011). 
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situation in Alaska is unique; native cultures are widely dispersed 
geographically and the state is filled with an extremely large number of 
cultural groups that, standing alone, may not have sufficient resources 
or support to bring claims of this magnitude.210 Although Alaska has the 
Alaska State Council on the Arts, this is a large and all-encompassing 
organization and is not narrowly focused on cultural property issues.211 
B. The Relative Silence of Alaska Natives as a Reflection of 
Problems in the Legal Framework 
 Alaska’s relative silence in the cultural property arena underscores 
national issues: some cultural groups and their members can assert 
cultural property rights and others cannot. Review suggests Alaska 
Natives may have less ability to enforce their rights than other American 
Indian groups. Moreover, all American Indians appear disadvantaged 
when compared to certain non-native groups, such as Holocaust victims.  
 The unequal treatment afforded by NAGPRA, especially as it 
relates to items the government deems important to particular religious 
practices, may raise due process concerns. Also, the Fourteenth 
Amendment was enacted to prevent “discriminat[ion] against 
‘emancipated Negroes and their white protectors,’”212 and this 
declaration of racial equality under the law extends to those of other 
races as well. Some argue American Indians are treated as “special” 
under the current cultural property paradigm and not equal, violating 
the Constitution’s equal protection.213 
 The unique nature of NAGPRA and its inherent special treatment is 
underscored by statements made surrounding its enactment. On 
October 26, 1990 Senator Daniel Inouye, John McCain’s co-chair on the 
Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, stated to members of the 
Senate: 
When human remains are displayed in museums or historical 
societies, it is never the bones of white soldiers or the first 
 
 210.  See American Indian and Alaska Native Tribes for the United States, Regions, 
Divisions, and States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/ 
population/www/cen2000/briefs/phct18/index.html (last visited Jan. 10, 
2011). 
 211.  See ALASKA STATE COUNCIL ON THE ARTS, http://www.eed.state.ak.us/ 
aksca (last visited Jan. 10, 2011). 
 212.  Sherry Hutt, If Geronimo Was Jewish: Equal Protection and the Cultural 
Property Rights of Native Americans, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 527, 527 (2004) (quoting 
ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON & WILLIAM M. BEANEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
381 (4th ed. 1968)). 
 213.  Id. at 528. 
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European settlers that came to this continent that are lying in 
glass cases. It is Indian remains. The message that this sends to 
the rest of the world is that Indians are culturally and 
physically different from and inferior to non-Indians. This is 
racism.214 
Although NAGPRA sought to eliminate this racism through special 
treatment, its application further complicated American Indian relations. 
One scholar, Sherry Hutt, argues that the treatment of American Indian 
cultural property can be starkly contrasted with the treatment of 
Holocaust-era art stolen from Jewish families.215 Hutt argues that if 
Geronimo had been Jewish, the American Indian cultural property 
would have been treated with the same high fiduciary standards and 
unilateral response as cultural property subject to Holocaust-era 
thefts.216 Sadly, this has not been the case, and American Indian cultural 
property has instead been treated as highly regulated government 
property.217 This treatment was intended to protect American Indian 
and non-native sites from looting.218 Current laws, Hutt argues, make 
the American Indian community unable to protect sacred sites and items 
removed from sacred lands.219 Even within this framework, some 
groups within the American Indian community are favored while others 
are disfavored. Alaska Natives, like Native Hawai’ians, are the 
unfortunate victims of a regime of laws which purport to protect the 
artistic and cultural pursuits of the American Indian community.220 
VI. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: STEPS TOWARDS REALIZING 
ALASKAN CULTURAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 While all of these factors undoubtedly have some bearing on 
Alaska’s silence in the cultural property discourse, the central question 
becomes: do Alaska Native cultures want to take the affirmative steps 
necessary to reclaim parts of their cultural heritage? If so, they must take 
the first steps quickly. By failing to exercise their legal authority now, 
Alaska Natives may be sitting idle while records that would provide for 
repatriation of cultural items become less traceable and less reliable. 
 
 214.  136 CONG. REC. 35,678 (1990) (statement of Sen. Daniel Inouye). 
 215.  Hutt, supra note 212, at 539. 
 216.  Id. at 539–41. 
 217.  Id. at 541. 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  Id. at 543. 
 220.  For a discussion of Hawaiian native tribes’ position with respect to 
NAGPRA, see Petrich, supra note 125, at 551, 567–68. 
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 To be sure, Alaska Natives have good reason to care about their 
cultural property. The museum community in Alaska recognizes and 
appreciates the vast cultural treasure created by Alaska Natives.221 If 
Alaska Natives are able to recover their cultural property, the state 
would be afforded an enormous educational resource. Members of 
tribes and cultural groups who are able to privately recover objects will 
be able to use these objects to teach future generations about their 
ancestors and traditions. If objects are recovered and transferred or 
loaned to Alaska museums, the state’s educational resources are 
immeasurably enhanced. While this educational goal is persuasive in 
many areas of the country, it is even more essential in Alaska. Currently, 
many unique Alaskan works of art and cultural objects are housed on 
the opposite side of the country, far beyond the reach of the majority of 
Alaskans. The objects themselves play a vital role in helping the current 
generation imagine and understand the past.222 Moreover, ensuring the 
long-term survival and protection of native cultural property in Alaska 
could foster a sense of tribal pride, which may be essential to the 
ongoing survival of Alaska Native cultures. 
 Increasing awareness will better enable interested parties to realize 
the return of Native Alaskan art and cultural objects. Non-profit groups, 
political organizations, and similar bodies can be instrumental in forging 
the relationships necessary for NAGPRA claims to flourish. By 
increasing general discourse on this topic, Alaskans may also begin to 
see a change in other issues contributing to the lack of cultural property 
assertions. For example, attorneys specializing in NAGPRA litigation 
may be drawn to the state if there is a viable market for cultural 
property claims. 
  The need for a central unifying authority to speak on the behalf of 
Alaska Natives and to support those with viable claims is of paramount 
urgency. Alaska Natives could establish a board dedicated to cultural 
property protection comprised of tribal representatives. The Mataatua 
Declaration on Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples could serve as one possible model.223 The board could adopt a 
uniform framework for approaching cultural property issues. The 
dialogue created by a board could help group members raise resources 
 
 221.  Crowell, supra note 186, at 12–14. 
 222.  Cf. Paul C. Ongtooguk & Claudia S. Dybdahl, Native Perspectives on 
Alaska’s History, in LIVING OUR CULTURES, SHARING OUR HERITAGE: THE FIRST 
PEOPLES OF ALASKA 28, 28 (Aron L. Crowell et al. eds., 2010) (“Museums display 
the art and artifacts of Alaska Native and Native American peoples, and writers, 
artists, and film makers reimagine the past.”). 
 223.  The Mataatua Declaration on Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, supra note 76. 
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and awareness about cultural preservation. Moreover, the board could 
serve as a coalition to pursue the claims of Alaska’s smaller native 
cultures or those with fewer resources. Group members may also benefit 
from working together to realize shared goals. 
 Alaska could also develop a state corollary to NAGPRA. Enacting 
state legislation would expand the scope of protectable cultural material 
as well as increase the awareness of cultural property issues facing 
Alaska Natives. Allowing Alaska Natives to reclaim their cultural 
heritage on a state level could, in turn, spur federal action. 
CONCLUSION 
 While some tribal representatives in Alaska’s largest native 
cultures have begun to contemplate repatriation, Alaska trails behind 
other states in repatriation efforts. The relative silence leaves Alaska 
Native cultural property vulnerable not only to illicit trade but also to 
denigration and destruction. Furthermore, it reduces the educational 
prospects for Alaska Natives hoping to use these treasures going 
forward. Alaska could take steps like increasing awareness through 
external boards and coalitions, establishing a coalition of tribal 
representatives to act on behalf of all Alaska Natives in addressing 
cultural property concerns, and enacting a state law parallel to 
NAGPRA. These steps would all increase awareness of native cultural 
property issues and encourage action. 
 Alaska’s relative silence in the cultural property discourse 
underscores important national issues. The unequal treatment of 
American Indian and Alaska Native objects should be a problem 
troubling to the American legal community. The current laws, such as 
NAGPRA, in practice grant some tribes and cultural groups legal access 
to their cultural objects at the expense of others. The net result is a 
hierarchy in which some groups are legally favored over others. To 
solve this problem, Americans must change many of their foundational 
views on cultural property and American Indian cultural contributions. 
Political reform, such as expanding NAGPRA’s scope of protection, is 
likely necessary to achieve full equality under the law for American 
Indians with respect to cultural property. Until this happens, Alaska 
Natives may want to take proactive steps to protect their cultural 
property. Otherwise, they may have to face a future with more limited 
access to their cultural contributions. 
 
